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post-World War II decade rising economic and
peoples in some of the less-developed

social demands of
areas

of the world have sometimes manifested themselves in

governmental taking of foreign-owned enterprises. In some
of these quarters the belief persists that governmental opera

in the Middle East and which have in

tion of enterprise will accelerate economic and social devel

come

opment. These

a number of instances
before the United Nations. It is also necessary to in
clude, here, constitutional developments in the United Na

tions

legally rationalized

events.

of state.

Organization itself, following on these Middle Eastern
My purpose is primarily to raise questions, knowing
that answers are difficult to reach, if attainable at all.
A catalogue of major legal issues might run as follows:

Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal valid, and
legal effects are to be attributed to it?
How were the military operations against Egypt by
Was

what

Israel, France, and
what

Great Britain

measures were to

to

be taken in

be characterized, and

oil

through

international

pipelines justified?
Does Egypt have valid claims for war damages against
Israel, France, and Great Britain? Do the decrees providing
for Egyptianization of foreign business enterprises in Egypt
give rise to justifiable international claims?
What are the rights of navigation in such waterways as
the Suez Canal, the Strait ofTiran, and the Gulf ofCAqaba?
NATIONALIZATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL

exercises of sovereignty

talking about the Middle East crisis, a convenient
point of beginning is the nationalization of the Suez Canal
by Egypt last July. Was the action lawful and valid? Did the
compensation offered by Egypt meet the requirements of
international law? Would the nationalization be accorded
extraterritorial effect as to assets of the Suez Canal Com
pany outside Egypt? Are shipowners paying tolls to Egypt
protected from lawsuits which might be brought by the

tolls? Professor Olmstead has already
given
comprehensive view of the various legal ques
tions raised by the Suez nationalization, so I shall refer here
same

us a

to certain aspects which have particularly con
cerned the United States government.
On the question of validity, the argument has been made
that the Suez Canal is an international public utility to

only briefly

on

page 5

or acts

of a private nature, examination of the legal and
policy problems raised by nationalizations and similar tak
ings of foreign-owned holdings appears desirable. A prin
cipal focal point to be developed is the legal effect of gov

vestment

takings of properties and
by foreign enterprise pursuant to

tween

The

other interests operated
valid agreement be

a

the government and such enterprise.
history of governmental takings seems

to

be

as

long

Early takings of private property did not
typically present international problems, for in the usual
case the
property was locally owned and the sovereign took
it through the exercise of eminent domain. The doctrine of
as

recordation.

eminent domain

developed

in

an era

when international

consequence and, therefore,
the practice of
Furthermore,
foreign
eminent domain, at this early date, was limited in scope and

did

In

Continued

being

Because of the contemporary interest of both capital
exporting and capital-importing countries in foreign in

investment

company for the

as

"confiscations," have been

or

ernmental

consequence?

Was the obstruction of the Suez Canal and of the flow of

termed "nationaliza

takings, variously

tions," "expropriations,"

not

subject

was

of little

affect

or no

interests.

matter, and the character of the

sovereign

was

in

personal sovereign frequently accorded a
measure of divine
right. Even a sovereign in this historic
was
limited in the exercise of eminent do
sense, however,
main to a taking for a public purpose. Such a purpose in
deed that of

this

a

sense was one

designed

to

accomplish

a

governmental,

distinguished from proprietary, purpose. Normally, the
validity of the taking was predicated upon the payment of
fair compensation to the owner.
The first significant nationalizations of the twentieth cen
tury were those decreed by the Russian Socialist Federated
Soviet Republic following the revolution in 1917. In im
portant respects the Russian Communist takings were
unique and marked a departure from prior practice of other
as

a
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which the ordinary rules concerning nationalization do not
apply. The history and provisions of the Constantinople
Convention of 1888 have been cited as a basis for the
proposition that the Canal was immunized by treaty from
nationalization. So far as the United States government is
concerned, it has reserved its position on this question and
indicated its disposition to try to work out a practical solution of the Canal problem which would protect the inter

policy was to place all means of produc
significant holdings of capital in the hands of the
state as an instrument for
carrying out certain political, eco
nomic, and social theories. These early Soviet confiscations
have served as the pattern for industry-wide takings de
signed to alter the economic and political bases of those

of all concerned.
International discussions prior to the outbreak of hostili
ties last fall were looking toward the conclusion of an agree
ment which would settle both the question of compensation
and the commitments regarding future operation of the
Canal. Following Egypt's rejection of proposals worked
out at London by a group of user nations, the United Na
tions Security Council on October 13, I956, adopted a
resolution-with the concurrence of Egypt-which set
forth six agreed requirements for a settlement governing
the Suez Canal. These requirements were as follows:
ests

(I)

there should be free and open transit through the Canal
overt or covert-this covers both
political

without discrimination,
and technical aspects;

(2) the sovereignty of Egypt should be respected;
(3) the operation of the Canal should be insulated from the
politics of any country;
(4) the manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by
agreement between Egypt and the users;
(5) a fair proportion of the dues should be allotted

to

deve1op-

ment;
Continued

on

states.

The Soviet

tion and

countries that have

World War II

come

under Communist control since

.

Before the revolution, foreign capital invested in Russia
to more than two billion rubles. This was com
pletely lost, and all private ownership of property in the

amounted

abolished. The Soviet government of
to foreigners or to Russians. This
action was accomplished by force, and, once the govern
ment proved that it was able to survive, there was little that
could be done through peaceful means to obtain redress.
Attempts were made by Russian nationals in the courts of
the United States and Britain to recover their confiscated
property which the Soviet government had sold to persons
who transported it to other forums. While there was some
early division of decision on the question of whether or not
the Soviet government obtained title, once that government
had received recognition by the states in which litigation
arose, the Soviet confiscations were brought under the
magic mantle of the "acts of state" doctrine, and all lived
ha ppil y ever after.
The second major nationalization of this century oc
curred in Mexico. By the end of the dictatorship ofDiaz in
Soviet Union

fered

no

was

compensation
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David Gooder, chairman of the Chicago Bar Association Committee on
International Law, opens the afternoon session of the Conference on In
ternational Law and the Middle East Crisis.
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Meekerof disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez
Canal Company and the Egyptian Government should be settled
by arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable provi
sions for the payment of sums found to be due;
in

case

...

Secretary-General Hammarskjold undertook to pursue
negotiations which he had begun earlier with Britain,

the

France, and Egypt in order to reach a formal agreement.
On October 24 he sent a letter to the Egyptian foreign
minister elaborating a plan based on the six requirements.
On November 2 Egypt addressed a reply which accepted
the principal features of Mr. Hammarskjold's plan. Then
there

was a

to

violations

Continued from page 5
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several months' hiatus in the

negotiations.

In

weeks the exchanges with Egypt have been renewed,
with the United States participating actively. It remains to
be seen what kind of permanent regime for the Canal will
emerge and what kinds of machinery and remedies will be
recent

available for the settlement of any differences

regarding

its

operation.
THE HOSTILITIES

path of peaceful settlement.
Israel sought to justify its attack on the ground that
Egypt had repeatedly violated the armistice agreement and
that there was no other way to safeguard Israel's security.
Raids across the armistice lines from Egyptian-controlled
territory inflicted serious and continuing harassment. On
the day following the Israeli invasioh, Britain and France
delivered ultimatums to both Israel and Egypt and an
nounced that they would land forces in Egypt to protect the
Suez Canal. President Eisenhower, on October 3 I, stated
that these actions by the three countries against Egypt could
scarcely be reconciled with the purposes and principles of
was

pleted.
We should

note that the General Assembly's resolutions
for
cease-fire
and withdrawal were recommenda
calling
tions and not binding decisions, such as the Security Council
could make under Chapter 7 of the Charter. Yet these calls
of the Assembly were heeded-and heeded with relative

promptness

Early

in

by

Britain and France.

November, before any withdrawals occurred,

the Soviet Union proposed the use of Soviet, as well as
United States, armed forces to aid in the defense of Egypt.
At once the United States declared its opposition to the in
troduction of Soviet or any other military forces into the
Middle East except under United Nations mandate. It fur
ther stated that any such move would be directly contrary
to the General Assembly's resolution of November 2 and
would violate the Charter-meaning Article 2, paragraph
which bans the use of armed force in any manner incon
sistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The United
Nations was then dealing actively with the situation
4,

through General Assembly cease-fire resolution, through
by the Secretary-General to secure compliance with
it, and through the setting-up of machinery to police the
a

The process of negotiating a Suez Canal settlement was
interrupted at the end of October, 1956, by the outbreak of
hostilities, which were certainly not unrelated to the Canal
problem. These hostilities were a radical deviation from the

the United Nations.
The Security Council

prevent a recurrence of old conflicts and armistice
once the withdrawal of forces had been com

British and

prevented by

efforts

cease-fire.
To

and supervise the cessation of hostilities, the
Assembly established the United Nations Emer

secure

General

gency Force. This was an innovation in international life.
Like the United Nations forces in Korea, this new force was

composed of units contributed by member states. But
similarity largely stopped there. The Assembly placed

the
the

force under the command of an individual officer chosen by
it-Canadian General Edson L. M. Burns. Costs of the
force were to be financed trom the United Nations budget
and contributions of non-participating countries (like the
United States) as well as by the countries supplying troops.
The mission of this force was laid down in a series of re
ports prepared by the Secretary-General at the Assembly's
request and then approved by the Assembly. The Secretary

General,

in consultation with

an

advisory

committee of

French vetoes from acting to deal with the situation. Now,
for the first time, an emergency special session of the Gen

United Nations members, was to play an important part in
governing the employment of the United Nations Emer

eral Assembly was summoned under the "Uniting for
Peace" resolution. It met on the evening of November I, a
little more than twenty-four hours after it had been called.
The General Assembly, at its meetings during the emer
gency special session and later during its eleventh regular
session, took three kinds of action. First, it called for a cessa
tion of hostilities and withdrawal of armed forces trom posi
tions occupied after the fighting broke out; this the As
sembly did on a number of occasions before the with
drawals were finally completed. Second, the General As

gency Force. This force, unlike the United Nations military
units in Korea, was not to be a combatant force. But, as an

sembly
secure

established

and

a

United Nations

supervise the

Assembly provided

Emergency

cessation of hostilities.

for the

taking

of various

Force

to

Finally,

the

measures

de-

international agency to supervise the cease-fire, it should be
free from the frustrations of the Neutral Nations Super
visory Commission in Korea, whose operation has been

largely

stalled

by

the

veto

power of its Communist

mem

bers.
Let

eral

us

the arrangements made by the Gen
bring about final withdrawal by Israel and

turn now to

Assembly

to

prevent a return of the very unsatisfactory state of affairs
that existed before hostilities began. On January 24 the
Secretary-General submitted a report proposing a number
of measures. Among them were the stationing of the United

The
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Emergency Force in the Gaza strip and on both
sides of the armistice line and the stationing of this force at
the Strait of Tiran. This strait leads from the head of the
Red Sea into the Gulf of -Aqaba. The gulf lies just to the
east of the Sinai Peninsula, and at its north end are two
Nations

ports: CAqaba in Jordan and Eilat in Israel.
The report of the Secretary-General also recalled a Se
curity Council resolution of 195 I declaring that there was
no basis for
Egypt's claim and exercise of belligerent rights
Israel
in view of the armistice agreement. For several
against
denied passage to Israeli commerce through
had
years Egypt
the Suez Canal and had blocked Israeli access to the Gulf of

CAqaba the Strait of Tiran.
On February 2 the General Assembly voted that the
measures proposed by the Secretary-General should be
taken. On the same day the Assembly called for the last
at

Law School

would
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be withdrawn from the Strait ofTiran without
to the Advisory Committee, which in turn

not

notice

prior

could decide whether the General Assembly ought to be
consulted.
On March r, following discussions with France and the
United States, Israel announced in the General Assembly
that it would complete the withdrawal of its armed forces in
accordance with the Assembly's resolutions and on the basis
of stated assumptions and expectations regarding control of
Gaza and access to the Gulf of CAqaba. In a letter to the
prime minister of Israel on March 2 President Eisenhower

expressed
and

the view that it

expectations

such

as

reasonable to entertain hopes
those voiced by the Israeli and

was

other delegations in the Assembly.
Thus the last withdrawals were completed

on

the basis of

of de facto arrangements arrived at
quite complicated
the
several
efforts
of
governments, the United Na
through
set

a

tions

Secretary-General,

Assembly.
Perhaps

and the processes of the General

mention should be made here of the

point that

the United Nations Emergency Force entered Egyptian ter
ritory with the consent of Egypt. I believe it would be

have asserted, that a United Nations
and
directed
by the General Assembly can
organized
with
the
territory only
sovereign's consent. Here,

wrong

force
enter

to

say,

as some

given, and this was done in an agree
that
force
should remain "until its task is
the
stating
seem to mean that
This
would
Egypt is not at
completed."
to decide that the force shall leave when
liberty, unilaterally,

however,

consent was

ment

Egypt

so

desires. It is for the United Nations also

to

decide

when the mission of the United Nations Emergency Force
is accomplished, or that for other reasons the force should be

Fiftieth Anniversary Yeat· for the Class of 1907. Shown
of the class who attended the annual Alumni
Luncheon. Left to right: William H. Jackson, Laird Bell, and Garfield
S. Canright.
This is the

above

are

three members

withdrawn. We may expect that the Secretary-General
would consult the Advisory Committee before withdraw

ing the force and that the Assembly-now in recess-might
well be reconvened to consider any such question.
OBSTRUCTION OF THE SUEZ CANAL

looked at some of the principal legal prob
arising during the Middle East crisis. I should perhaps
mention a few others. There is, for example, the obstruction
of the Suez Canal. After hostilities began last fall, a large
number of vessels were sunk in the Canal, and a bridge over
it was demolished. These actions, according to available in
We have

time upon Israel to complete the withdrawal of its forces
behind the armistice line. Israel, however, remained unwill

ing
the

to

withdraw from Gaza and from the

coast

bordering

ofTiran.

Straight
Subsequently,

the United States stated its view, in a
the Israeli government, that the Gulf of
CAqaba comprehended international waters and that there
was a right of free and innocent passage in the gulf and

memorandum

to

through the strait giving access to it.
Hammarskjold reported Egyptian

On

February

22

Mr.

agreement that the
United Nations' take-over in Gaza should be "exclusive"
during an initial period, despite Egypt's right of occupancy
under the armistice agreement, and that the United Nations
should continue to have a substantial role after this period.
On February 25 he indicated in a memorandum given to
the

Assembly

that the United Nations

Emergency

Force

now

lems

formation, were taken by Egypt. Assuming the correctness
of that information, were they permissible under the Con

stantinople

Convention of r888?

Article I of the treaty

provides:

The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time
of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war,
without distinction of flag.
the High Contracting Parties agree not in any
interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as in

Consequently,
way

to

time of peace.

Article IV

states:
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remaining open in time of war as a free
ships of war of belligerents, according to the
of the present Treaty, the High Contracting

The Maritime Canal
the

even to

passage,
terms of Article I

Parties agree that no
for its object

right

having

to

of war,

of hostility,

no act

obstruct the free

nor

any

act

navigation of the Canal,

shall be committed in the Canal and its ports of access, as well as
a radius of 3 marine miles from those
ports, even though the
Ottoman Empire should be one of the belligerent Powers.

within
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distinct from forcible-means of dealing with
them. There has been emphasis on solution of problems
within a framework oflaw, with reliance on the Charter of

legal-as

the United Nations and the operation of its organs.
What significance is discernible here? First, I suppose it
may be said that governments have

employed the discourse
of international law because they thought it relevant to the
problems and useful in public presentation of their positions.

Article IX gave the Turkish and Egyptian authorities the
right to take measures "for securing by their own forces the

In other

defense of

A second point to be noted is that international debate
and consideration of legal questions can produce develop
ments in the body of international law. A consensus may
emerge where there were not generally agreed views before
or where the field had not
previously been plowed. This

Egypt

But Article XI

fere with the free
Was

and the maintenance of

specified that these measures
use

public

order."

"shall not inter

of the Canal."

Egypt, therefore,

entitled

to

block the Canal? Is

Egypt liable to maritime nations for the losses they have
suffered in consequence? Is Egypt liable for losses resulting
from its action in slowing down the process of clearing the
Canal after that was undertaken by the United Nations at
Egypt's request? These are questions which do not seem
likel y to receive direct answers in any international judicial

proceedings.
clearing

The United States advanced $5,000,000 out of a total of
approximately $12,000,000. The question remains un
solved as to how these advances will be repaid.

Then there is the question of "war damages" which
Egypt has talked of claiming. Egyptian spokesmen have

France, and Britain with liability for loss of
life and property occurring in Egypt during the hostilities.
Egyptian representatives at the United Nations circulated a
proposal in December, I956, to have the Secretary-General
make a survey of damage.
It should be evident, in connection with an y proposal to
settle claims for war damages, that there are many other

charged Israel,

those

relating nationalization of the Suez
Canal, to loss and damage caused by raids across the arrni
stice lines, to destroyed pipelines, to the "Egyptianization"
decrees, and perhaps to economic losses from closure of the
Canal. It would be only just that all these should be adjudi
cated together if ever there is to be litigation.
There seems to be a possibility of adjudication concern
as

ing transit through the

to

Canal and passage

through the

Strait

ofTiran and Gulf ofCAqaba. Israel has indicated its intention
to
attempt such transit and passage for Israeli commerce,
while indications of continuing opposition have come from
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Submission to the International
Court of Justice has been

suggested.

CONCLUSION

As

we

look back

over

the

events

of the Middle East crisis,

may observe that governments have focused attention
upon substantive questions of international law and upon
we

reality

words, international law
that

they

must

process has perhaps taken
Middle East crisis.
How has the

law

was

considered

enough

of

reckon with it.

place

to some extent

operated during

during

the

the Middle East crisis?

might look, for example, at the withdrawal of British
and French, and ultimately Israeli, forces. In the General
We

Assembly debate a preponderance of opinion was marshaled

of the Canal, it is worth
noting that the United Nations undertook the 'job upon a
request from Egypt. The United Nations then solicited and
obtained advances of funds to defray the cost of clearing.
In connection with the

claims-such

a

in support of the law of the Charter and

given expression in

Assembly's resolutions calling for cease-fire and with
drawal. Behind these resolutions lay the threat of United
Nations sanctions, which are open to the Assembly under
Articles 10 and I I of the Charter and are contemplated by
the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. Israel, France, and
Britain were subjected by other countries to strong pres
sures to
comply with the Assembly's call-various and di
as
vergent
might have been the aims of those other coun
the

tries.

peril, because of the possibility of a
of
the
conflict, the nations in effect agreed to
spreading.
the
law
of
Charter. This did not result from the
the
apply
direct application of definitive rules by an international
agency endowed with governmental power as we know it
In

a

situation of great

in domestic law. Much

negotiation

was

involved, both

in

side and outside the United Nations, as to the means of
applying the basic proposition that military forces should be

withdrawn behind the armistice lines. This was done in or
der to take account of legitimate concerns and interests on
both sides regarding security and legal rights: In the end,
common ground was reached, and the law had pragmatic
effect.
The forum of the United Nations and the good offices of
the Secretary-General proved a valuable catalyst in the
process. We should note here, from the constitutional point
of view, that the office and functions of the Secretary-Gen
eral have developed considerably in scope and influence

few months. It is possible that the principal
of the United Nations, the International
Court of Justice, will have an increased role to play in the
future.
United Nations rules and processes for dealing with in
ternational conflicts tend toward the elimination of the use

during the last
judicial organ
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of armed force. This is surely a development to be wel
comed. Once again the comparison with Korea suggests it
self In the Middle East, as in Korea, there has been no effec

for either side. An armistice is once
again
question remains how this uneasy situa
tion can be stabilized and progress be made toward a,
durable settlement.
There is a pressing need for the community of nations to
find, develop, and employ effective means to make just and
viable settlements of the problems to which force was once
applied as the solvent. Unless this is done, we cannot be
confident that the ground seemingly won will be held
that the world's hold on peace is secure. Groping efforts
toward peace with justice are discernible in the arrange
ments made by the United Nations to try to establish peace
ful conditions between Israel and Egypt. We shall have to
wait longer to judge the outcome-whether it holds real
hope because the nations of the world are determined that
their common efforts shall succeed or whether some new
beginnings must be made.
The web of history is slowly woven.

Lloyd, JD 23, speaking to the annual Alumni Luncheon in the
Law Library. Mr. Lloyd, past president of The Law School Alumni
Association, is Chairman of the Board oj Trustees of the University.
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military victory
in effect. The
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law was
confirmed by

passed whereby the concessions were to be
"issuing," not "granting," confirmatory con

cessions without limitation of time. The

all the land in Mexico was owned by
some one thousand powerful families. Article 27 of the 1917
constitution laid the foundation for agrarian reform and the
expropriation of foreign-held land and oil interests. It gave
onl y Mexicans, or foreigners who were by special agree
ment to be treated as Mexicans without recourse to their
19II

(1877-19II)

governments, the right to acquire ownership in or ex
ploit Mexican natural resources. The constitution further
provided for expropriation of private property tor reasons
of public utility. Confiscations were forbidden. In I923 the
United States accepted compensation in the form of federal
bonds for certain lands, and a commission was set up to
adjudicate claims, though it never settled any. By 1938 the
Mexican government had "nationalized" moderate-sized
holdings estimated by their United States owners to be
worth ten million dollars. Three million dollars was finally
paid by Mexico to satisfy these claims.
Parallel to the land questions, though handled separately
and raising different legal problems, was the expropriation
of oil rights that had been granted to various foreign com
panies prior to I9I9. At that time the owner of the surface
had right to the subsurface minerals. Article 27 vested the
nation with all the subsurface rights, but it was held not to
be retroactive in effect. Mexico tried to restrict the length of
own

time that the

foreign concessions could run to fifty years by
by concessions
which would be granted by the Mexican government.
Long diplomatic correspondence followed, and the law was
finally declared unconstitutional in certain parts in 1927. A
requiring

that the concessions be confirmed

question then
until
when
President
I936,
years,
Cardenas had carried the agrarian reform near completion
and turned his attention to other matters. On March 18,
seemed settled for

some

1938, the Labor Board declared all oil-company labor con
canceled, and President Cardenas signed the expropri
ation decree expropriating the foreign oil companies' inter
tracts

in Mexico.

ests

The expropriation had its immediate

origin

in

a

labor

controversy but was really an expression of the second ob
jective of the Mexican revolution, the "Mexicanization of
industry." The expropriation of oil, unlike the expropria
tion
as

ofland, did

only

the

not

affect Mexican and foreigner equally,
oil interests were nationalized. The

foreign
recognized

United States
ate

the oil

resources

but,

the
as

right

of Mexico

in the land

to

question,

expropri
demanded

that prompt and just payment be made. Mexico had argued
in the land question that all the foreigner could ask was

equality

of treatment with the national but admitted liabil

ity to compensate. The issue Was finally resolved in a similar
fashion to the land question.
It is significant to note that, so far as the oil expropria
tions

were

concerned,

agreements with oil

Mexico breached valid concession

companies

in this and other countries.

But, recognizing a "sovereign" power in Mexico to ter
minate the agreements, the United States government
pressed only for compensation and did not question the
basic abrogation of contractual obligations by the govern
ment.

